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Abstract 
A key aspect of theory of mind is the ability to reason 
about other people's desires. As adults, we know that desires 
and preferences are subjective and specific to the individual. 
However, research in cognitive development suggests that a 
significant conceptual shift occurs in desire-based reasoning 
between 14 and 18 months of age, allowing 18- but not 14-
month-olds to understand that different people can have 
different preferences (Lucas et al., 2014; Ma & Xu 2011; 
Repacholi & Gopnik, 1997). The present research investigates 
the kind of evidence that is relevant for inducing this shift and 
whether younger infants can be trained to learn about the 
diversity of preferences. In Experiment 1, infants younger 
than 18 months of age were shown demonstrations in which 
two experimenters either liked the same objects as each other 
(in one training condition) or different objects (in another 
training condition). Following training, all infants were asked 
to share one of two foods with one of the experimenters – 
they could either share a food that the experimenter showed 
disgust towards (and the infants themselves liked) or a food 
that the experimenter showed happiness towards (and the 
infants themselves did not like). We found that infants who 
observed two different experimenters liking different objects 
during training later provided the experimenter with the food 
she liked, even if it was something they disliked themselves. 
However, when infants observed two experimenters liking the 
same objects, they later incorrectly shared the food that they 
themselves liked with the experimenter. Experiment 2 
controlled for an alternative interpretation of these findings. 
Our results suggest that training allows infant to overturn an 
initial theory in the domain of Theory of Mind for a more 
advanced one.  
Keywords: Theory of mind; Desire-based reasoning; Infant 
learning; Social cognition; Preferences. 
Introduction 
As social creatures, we are constantly trying to figure out 
what other people are thinking. The ability to infer others’ 
mental states, such as their desires and beliefs, serves a 
number of important functions. It allows us to please or 
irritate others, to understand why they engage in particular 
acts, and to predict their future behavior. These abilities 
hinge on our having a well-developed theory of mind – the 
understanding that people have mental states (e.g., desires, 
beliefs, intentions) and that these mental states can differ 
from person to person (Gopnik & Wellman 1994). 
Explicit theory of mind undergoes significant 
development during infancy and early childhood, as 
children first reason based on knowledge about others’ 
desires and then later incorporate knowledge about others’ 
beliefs. How do children arrive at these more sophisticated 
beliefs about the minds of other people? 
This paper focuses on the development of desire-based 
reasoning, or the ability to consider a person’s wants, likes, 
and dislikes when reflecting on their behavior. For example, 
children as young as two years understand that people’s 
actions and emotions are influenced by their desires; they 
know that a person will attend to objects that they want to 
obtain and will be sad if their desires go unfulfilled 
(Wellman and Woolley, 1990). 
The present experiments examine a shift that occurs in 
infants’ desire-based reasoning, specifically in their 
reasoning about preferences. The paradigm is based on a 
study that asked whether infants understand that preferences 
can serve as an underlying cause of people's behaviors 
(Repacholi & Gopnik, 1997). Fourteen- and eighteen-
month-old infants were presented with two different types 
of food: Goldfish crackers and broccoli. The experimenter 
determined which food the infants liked (the majority 
preferred Goldfish crackers). She then demonstrated, using 
emotional expressions and simple language, that she 
preferred either that same food (Goldfish crackers in a 
“matched” trial) or the opposite food (broccoli in an 
“unmatched” trial), depending on the experimental 
condition. When infants were asked to share some food with 
the experimenter, the two age groups differed in their 
responses. The 18-month-olds were able to correctly 
determine the experimenter's preferences based on her 
previous behaviors, and thus correctly gave her the food that 
she liked, whether the infant themselves preferred this food 
or not. However, the 14-month-olds gave the experimenter 
the food that they themselves preferred, regardless of her 
demonstrated preferences. This difference in performance 
has been interpreted to suggest that some time around 18 
months of age, infants’ desire-based reasoning undergoes a 
significant conceptual change, moving from a simple to a 
more complex model of preferences. That is, infants 
younger than 18 months may have a very simple notion of 
preferences in which they initially assume that preferences 
are universal, rather than varying between people1. In 
 
1For simplicity, we will characterize younger infants as 
assuming that preferences are universal. An alternative possibility 
is that infants are instead sensitive to the relative desirability of 
objects, reasoning that some things in the world are inherently 
more desirable than others. This reasoning would also result in 
infants always sharing the item that they personally like with the 
experimenter, as they would see it as the objectively better item. 
 
contrast, older infants seem to recognize that desires are 
diverse. 
What occurs between the ages of 14 and 18 months to 
promote such a significant advance in Theory of Mind? In a 
recent paper, Lucas et al. (2014) suggested that infants 
might first favor the simpler or “universal” model of 
preferences because it gives a parsimonious explanation for 
most of the data they encounter. For example, it is often the 
case that preferences converge – most people like the taste 
of pizza but they aren’t as enthusiastic about lima beans. 
However, as children observe more choices, they have 
increasingly robust evidence that people have divergent 
desires. The hypothesis is that as children grow older they 
accumulate evidence pushing them away from the simple 
but incorrect initial model toward a more complex and 
flexible model, which allows them to consider the 
consequences of distinct preferences. The suggestion is that 
during this transition, children must observe or participate in 
many desire-based interactions where people make choices 
or produce other signals to suggest that their preferences are 
incongruent with one another or with the infants themselves.  
The idea that infants might shift from a simple to a more 
complex model was formalized as part of a broader look 
into whether children learn preferences in a way that is 
rational or optimal under certain assumptions (Lucas et al., 
2014). Lucas et al. explored the idea that children have tacit 
hypotheses about others’ behaviors or underlying mental 
states, and evaluate those hypotheses against incoming data 
in a manner consistent with Bayes Theorem. If children 
expect others to have consistent preferences for options or 
features (like goldfish crackers, or saltiness) and choose the 
most attractive option based on the combined desirability of 
its features – including some features that might be hidden 
to the child – their preference attributions should be 
consistent with the predictions of a widely-used economic 
model, the Mixed Multinomial Logit (MML).  
The MML is generally used to predict consumer behavior, 
but it also succeeded in providing a unified account of data 
from a wide range of experiments on children’s 
understanding of preferences.  It accounts for preschoolers’ 
ability to infer preferences from the statistical properties of a 
collection of objects and an agent’s choices (Kushnir, Xu, 
&, Wellman, 2010) and for children’s ability to use shared 
preferences, as well as their knowledge of category 
membership, as a means for making generalizations 
(Fawcett & Markson, 2010) – see Lucas et al. for details. 
This modeling work also yielded an important empirical 
prediction about the development of desire-based reasoning: 
if younger children were provided evidence of diverse 
desires through lab-based training, then they might be able 
to transition to the more complex model of preference 
attribution. We test this hypothesis here using a training 
study with 14- to 17-month-old infants in two experiments. 
In Experiment 1 we began by assessing infants’ 
                                                                               
While this is an important distinction we will not discuss it further, 
because both processes result in identical behavior in our task.    
understanding of preferences by testing them in a modified 
version of Repacholi & Gopnik’s (1997) Goldfish/broccoli 
task. All infants were tested in the critical unmatched trial 
type, wherein the experimenter’s preference conflicted with 
the infant’s preference. Only infants who failed to give the 
experimenter the food that she liked continued to a training 
condition. The critical manipulation is that half of the 
infants completed a “Diverse Desires Training” condition 
(henceforth, DDT) where they observed multiple training 
trials with two experimenters demonstrating different 
preferences from one another. The other half completed a 
“Non-Diverse Desires” Training condition (henceforth, N-
DDT), where they observed multiple training trials with two 
experimenters demonstrating the same preferences. 
Following training, infants were tested again on two 
unmatched test trials, one directly after training and the 
other approximately 24 hours later. The second test trial 
occurred 1 day later to examine how enduring the effects of 
training might be – would the effect still be evident 
following a delay? We predict that only infants in the DDT 
condition should show improved performance in attributing 
preferences on the test trials.  
Experiment 1: Methods 
Participants 
Infants in both experiments were recruited by phone and 
email from the California East Bay Area and Southwestern 
Ontario. In Experiment 1, 55 infants were tested. We used 
the strict criterion that only infants who did not share the 
correct item on an initial pre-test (described below) 
continued to training, increasing our confidence that infants 
completing training did not already know that preferences 
are diverse. Twenty infants per condition were tested in the 
full training procedure (DDT: mean age = 15.7 months; 
Range = 14.1 months to 17.5 months; N-DDT: mean age = 
15.6 months; Range = 14.4 months to 17.2 months). An 
additional 15 infants were tested but excluded from analyses 
due to failing to complete the study because of fussiness (2) 
or refusing to share on the pre-test and all test trials (13). 
Materials 
Food. Four sets of food pairs were used in the experiment. 
The pairs were broccoli and Goldfish crackers, celery and 
rice puffs, cucumbers and Cheerios, and green peppers and 
wheel-shaped infant crackers.  
Toys. Two sets of toys were used during the training 
sessions; each set consisted of one type of animal and one 
type of vehicle in a transparent container. The sets of toys 
were 4 trucks and 4 dogs,, and 4 planes and 4 monkeys. The 
toys within each type were not identical; they varied in color 
and shape.  
Procedure, Design and Predictions 
All infants were tested individually in a quiet lab setting. 
They sat in a high chair in front of a table and their parent 
sat in a chair beside them. Before the study began, two 
experimenters played a passing game with the infant. This 
allowed the infant to warm up to the experimenters and to 
 ensure that they could share with the experimenters. The 
warm up consisted of each experimenter passing a toy (e.g., 
a ball or toy keys) to the infant and asking him/her to pass it 
back by placing it in the experimenters' hands.  
Pre-test.  The pre-test was based on Repacholi & Gopnik 
(1997). Experimenter 1 slid a plate of food consisting of a 
few pieces of vegetables and snacks (e.g. raw broccoli and 
Goldfish crackers) towards the infant and encouraged the 
infant to try some. The experimenter gave the infant a 45 
second time frame to taste the foods and the experimenter 
determined which of the two foods the infant preferred. We 
used the same coding as in Repacholi & Gopnik (1997) to 
determine food preferences on all trials (pre- and post-tests). 
Inter-coder agreement for preferences was 91%. When the 
infant's preference was determined, the experimenter took 
out a container consisting of the same foods the infant had 
tried. The experimenter then demonstrated that she liked the 
food that the infant did not show a preference for and was 
disgusted by the food that the infant preferred. The 
experimenter showed her preferences by saying, e.g., 
"Eww! Crackers! I tasted the crackers! Eww!", and "Mmm! 
Broccoli! I tasted the broccoli! Mmm!". The experimenter 
showed a liking and disliking towards each food three times 
and she did this using facial expressions based on the 
descriptions of Ekman & Friesen (1975). Next, the 
experimenter placed broccoli on one side of a tray and 
Goldfish crackers on the other, placed her hand with her 
palm up towards the infant, said, “can you give me some?” 
and slid the tray towards the infant. The infant was given 
45s to pass food to the experimenter. If the infant gave the 
experimenter the food that the experimenter showed a 
preference towards, then the infant passed the pre-test. If the 
infant gave the experimenter the food that she disliked, or 
did not provide the experimenter with any food, then the 
infant failed the pre-test.  
Training Trials.  Infants who failed the pre-test were 
introduced to either the DDT condition or the N-DDT 
condition. Infants in the DDT condition saw two 
experimenters liking and disliking different toys and infants 
in the N-DDT condition saw two experimenters liking and 
disliking the same toys. 
    Training proceeded as follows: Training trial 1 occurred 
right after the pre-test. During training trial 1, Experimenter 
1 put a jar of toys (e.g., dogs and trucks) onto the table and 
subsequently pulled out three toy of one type (e.g., dogs) 
and expressed liking towards them. Then the experimenter 
pulled out three toys of the other type (e.g., trucks) and 
expressed dislike towards them. The dialogue and facial 
expressions used were similar to that used during the pre-
test. The experimenter expressed her preferences by saying, 
"Yay! A dog! I got a dog! Yay!", and "Eww! A truck! I 
picked up a truck! Eww!". Once Experimenter 1 expressed 
her emotions for each type of toy three times, Experimenter 
2 took over. Experimenter 2 showed liking and disliking 
towards the same toys as Experimenter 1 if the infant was in 
the N-DDT condition (e.g., liked dogs and disliked trucks) 
and she showed liking and disliking towards the opposite 
toys as Experimenter 1 if the infant was in the DDT 
condition (e.g., liked trucks and disliked dogs).  
    Training trial 2 involved Experimenter 2 and the infant. It 
was similar to the pre-test, except that it involved a different 
set of food (e.g., celery and puffs) and excluded the testing 
part of the pre-test. Experimenter 2 gave the infant a plate of 
food and determined which food the infant preferred within 
45s. In the DDT condition, the experimenter then 
demonstrated that she preferred the food that the infant 
disliked and disliked the food that the infant preferred. In 
the N-DDT condition, the experimenter demonstrated that 
she liked and disliked the same foods as the infant. The 
infant was not asked to share any food with the 
experimenter, as this was a training trial and not a test. 
    Training trial 3 was identical to training trial 1, but with a 
different set of toys (e.g., monkeys and planes). 
Experimenter 1 expressed liking to one type of toy and 
dislike towards the other type of toy. Experimenter 2 had a 
turn expressing her emotions towards each of the toys. She 
expressed happiness and dislike towards the same toys as 
Experimenter 1 if the infant was in the N-DDT condition 
and expressed happiness and dislike towards the opposite 
toys as Experimenter 1 if the infant was in the DDT 
condition. After Experimenter 2 finished her 
demonstrations, infants completed training task 1. 
Experimenter 2 put one of each type of toy on both sides of 
a tray (e.g., a monkey on right, a plane on left), placed her 
palms face up towards the infant, pushed the tray towards 
the infant and asked the infant to share one with her. The 
infants were given 45s to share a toy with the experimenter. 
Once the infant shared a toy with Experimenter 2, 
Experimenter 1 had a chance to ask the infant to share with 
her the toy that she liked.  
Training trial 4 was a repetition of training trial 3 and 
included a training task that was identical to the one 
completed after training trial 3.  
    The purpose of the training tasks, where infants were 
asked to share one of two toys with each experimenter, was 
simply to ensure that the infants did not get bored and 
continued to share throughout the study. We did not expect 
that infants would remember which experimenter preferred 
which toy and in fact we found that infants did not reliably 
remember the experimenters’ preferences in either condition 
of Experiment 1 or in Experiment 2 (all p’s > .25 for 
ANOVA’s examining infants’ passing behavior based on 
the experimenters’ choices). 
    Post-training test 1 immediately followed training. It was 
identical to the pre-test, except with different food (e.g., 
cucumbers and Cheerios). Once the infant shared a food on 
post-test 1, the first day of the study was complete.  
    Infants returned on Day 2 to complete post-training test 2. 
Infants again warmed up with Experimenter 1 by playing 
the warm-up game from Day 1. This was followed by post-
training test 2, which was identical to the pre-test and post-
training test 1, but again with a different set of food (e.g., 
 
green peppers and wheel-shaped crackers).2 
Design The foods used on each trial were randomized (some 
infants saw broccoli and Goldfish on the pre-test, some on 
training trial 2, some on post-training test 1 and some on 
post-training test 2). The side of the tray that each food item 
appeared on during the sharing part of the pre-test and post-
training tests was randomized. For training trials, if 
Experimenter 1 liked animals and disliked vehicles in the 
first training trial, she would continue to like animals and 
dislike vehicles in subsequent training trials. For half the 
participants, Experimenter 1 liked animals and for the other 
half, Experimenter 1 liked vehicles. This was crossed with 
half of the infants seeing dislikes expressed first and half 
seeing likes expressed first. None of these counterbalancing 
factors led to any systematic differences in the data (when 
entered into ANOVAs, all p’s > .5 for these factors). 
Predictions  We predicted that infants in the DDT condition 
would be more likely to offer the experimenter the correct 
food on the post-tests than infants in the N-DDT condition 
even though both conditions provided infants with practice 
in considering other people's preferences and desires. In the 
N-DDT condition, infants saw two experimenters liking the 
same objects – this does not provide the infants with any 
information that allows them to learn that different people 
can have different mental states. In the DDT condition, 
infants saw two experimenters display different preferences 
from each other, which would provide a great deal of 
evidence to suggest that different people can have different 
preferences.  
Experiment 1: Results 
Of the initial 55 infants who participated in the 
experiment, 15 passed the pre-test by giving the correct food 
(p < .01, binomial, significantly fewer than chance), 34 
infants shared the incorrect food, and 6 infants shared 
nothing, replicating that infants this age perform below 
chance on this task (Repacholi & Gopnik, 1997). This 
confirms that, in general, infants below 18 months are 
inclined to share the item that they themselves prefer, not 
the item for which another person has shown a preference.  
For the 40 infants who failed the pre-test and continued to 
training, post-training test 1 performance was identical 
across training conditions (DDT: 7/20 correct; N-DDT: 7/20 
correct). Interestingly, performance differed by training 
condition for post-training test 2 (DDT: 15/20 correct; N-
DDT: 7/20 correct, X2(1, N=40)=6.46, p=.01). Only the 
performance on post-training test 2 for infants in the DDT 
condition was significantly above chance (p=.04, binomial). 
 
2  For the first 10 infants in both training conditions, the 
food on post-training test 2 was identical to the food on training 
trial 2 (which the infant used with Experimenter 2 on Day 1 but did 
not share). We switched this to a new food type to ensure that any 
improvement in infants’ performance on Day 2 in DDT could not 
be explained by already being familiar with those foods. 
Experiment 1: Discussion 
Our results suggest that the type of information provided 
during training was crucial to infants’ learning about diverse 
desires. When infants were provided with a large number of 
instances indicating that two different people can like 
different things, they appeared to learn to share the item that 
they disliked but the experimenter preferred. However, 
infants' performance did not improve when they 
sawpreferences that were not diverse:  infants in the N-DDT 
condition did not share the correct food with the 
experimenter on any post-training tests. This suggests that 
training with appropriate evidence can result in significant 
changes to children’s explicit Theory of Mind. 
But why did infants in the DDT condition only 
demonstrate advances in understanding on Day 2 of the 
experiment, during the second post-training test? We see at 
least two possible explanations. One possibility is that post-
training test 1 served as a final training trial, giving infants 
the minimum number of examples required to change their 
model of how preferences work (i.e., to learn that they apply 
to the individual). A second possibility is that a night of 
sleep resulted in improved learning of this general 
knowledge about other’s minds, allowing infants to pass the 
test on Day 2 but not on Day 1. We will address these 
possibilities more fully in the General Discussion.  
Before we can speculate as to why children appeared to 
learn something new about preferences in the DDT 
condition, we must first investigate an alternative 
interpretation of the Experiment 1 data. It is possible that the 
infants in the DDT condition did not learn that preferences 
are diverse, but instead learned something less conceptually 
powerful like, "In this game I’m playing, people always get 
opposite things, so I should just give the other person the 
thing that I didn’t take". If this is the case, then the 
participants did not learn that preferences are specific to the 
individual; they learned to play a game of opposites. We ran 
a second experiment to tease apart these explanations. 
Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 explored the alternative interpretation that 
infants in the DDT condition of Experiment 1 only learned 
to give the experimenter the opposite food from what they 
liked. Infants completed the same training as in the DDT 
condition of Experiment 1 but with a “matched” trial on 
post-training test 2. In a matched trial type, the experimenter 
demonstrates the same preference as the infant, instead of 
demonstrating opposite preferences. In this case, if infants 
in Experiment 1 DDT condition learned that preferences are 
specific to the individual, and that is why they tended to 
share the correct food with the experimenter on post-
training test 2, then they should give the experimenter the 
food she likes even though this is also the food that the 
infant herself likes. Conversely, if infants in the DDT 
condition of Experiment 1 learned through the course of the 
session that people should simply always be given opposite 
things to their partner, then they will give the experimenter 
the food that they themselves do not like on post-training 
 test 2, even though the experimenter demonstrates that she 
likes the food that the infant also prefers. We maintained the 
exact same procedure as in the DDT condition of 
Experiment 1, including using an “unmatched” trial type for 
post-training test 1, as the effect was observed only in post-
training test 2 and so every aspect of the experimental 
session must remain the same until that point. 
Experiment 2: Methods 
Participants  
Participants were 29 infants and, as in Experiment 1, only 
children who failed to give the correct food on the initial 
pre-test continued to training with 20 infants tested in the 
full training procedure (mean age = 15.5 months; Range = 
14.4 months to 17.0 months). An additional 10 infants were 
tested but not included in data analyses due to failing to 
complete the study because of fussiness (1), parental 
interference (1) or refusing to share anything with the 
experimenters on all test trials (8). 
 
Materials 
Food. The food was the same as in Experiment 1 except that 
the wheel-shaped crackers were replaced with Animal 
Crackers. This was done because we could no longer find 
the wheel-shaped crackers. 
Toys. The sets of toys were 4 hippos and 4 trucks, and 4 
cats and 4 planes. Again, all of the toys within an individual 
type were slightly different in shape and/or color. 
 
Procedure and Design  
The experimental procedure, counterbalancing and 
randomization were identical to Experiment 1 DDT.  
 
Predictions We predicted that infants would perform at 
chance on post-training test 1, as they did in Experiment 1. 
If infants give the experimenter the correct food on post-test 
2 (the food that both the experimenter and the infant like), 
then this will suggest that infants in Experiment 1 did not 
simply learn to play a game of opposites but instead learned 
that preferences are diverse. 
Experiment 2: Results 
Again we replicated the findings from Repacholi & 
Gopnik (1997), as 9/29 infants passed the pre-test (p =.06, 
binomial, marginally significantly fewer than chance), 18 
infants shared the incorrect food and 2 infants shared 
nothing. 
 Six out of 20 infants were correct on post-training test 1 
and 13 out of 20 were correct on post-training test 2, both 
not significantly different from chance (p = .12 and p = .26, 
respectively).  
The critical comparison is between infants’ performance 
on post-training test 2 in the Experiment 1 DDT condition 
and in Experiment 2. This comparison addresses whether 
infants in Experiment 1 simply learned to play a game of 
opposites and would have shared the opposite food type to 
their own preference regardless of what the experimenter 
demonstrated on post-test 2. For this analysis, we coded 
infants’ performance in terms of whether they gave the 
experimenter the opposite food to what the infant preferred 
(which is correct in Exp 1 DDT but incorrect in Exp 2). We 
gave infants a score of 1 for sharing the opposite food and a 
score of zero for sharing the same (non-opposite) food. This 
coding resulted in a score of 7/20 for post-training test 2 in 
Experiment 2 and 15/20 on post-training test 2 in the DDT 
condition of Experiment 1. Using a Fisher’s Exact test, we 
found that infants’ performance on these trials was 
significantly different from one another, X2(1, N=40)=6.46, 
p=.01, suggesting that infants in Experiment 1 were more 
likely to share the opposite food than infants in Experiment 
2, where they would have been incorrect in doing so. 
Experiment 2: Discussion 
Overall, most infants gave the experimenter the food that 
she preferred (and that the infant also preferred) on post-
training test 2 (this was not significantly different from 
chance using a binomial test). Though we would have 
expected infants to share the correct food at higher than 
chance levels in this “matched” trial, we suspect that the 
non-significant result is due to a lack of statistical power 
caused by having relatively few participants for binomial 
statistics. In general, the percentage of infants offering the 
correct, “matched” food on this trial is very similar to the 
percentage of younger infants who did so in Repacholi & 
Gopnik (1997) (65% vs. 72%, respectively).  
The purpose of Experiment 2 was to eliminate the 
possible explanation that participants in the Experiment 1 
DDT condition only learned to give the experimenter the 
opposite food of what they themselves wanted. Comparison 
of Experiments 1 and 2 suggest that this was not the case, as 
infants shared the food that they preferred in Experiment 2 
and did not reflexively give the experimenter the opposite 
food following training.  
General Discussion 
Together, these findings show that infants younger than 
18 months can learn about the subjectivity of preferences 
when provided with appropriate training. Before infants 
were exposed to any training, they provided an adult with 
the food that they personally liked and not one the 
experimenter liked, presumably because they incorrectly 
believed that preferences are universal. However, when 
provided with diverse preferences during training, infants 
were able to reason correctly about another person’s 
preferences, providing the experimenter with the food that 
she liked. In contrast, the infants who only saw congruent 
expressions of liking and disliking options did not learn to 
reason correctly about another person’s preferences, and 
continued to give the experimenter the food that they 
themselves preferred, regardless of the experimenter’s 
preference.  
Experiment 2 helped to clarify these findings, providing 
evidence that infants did not simply learn to always give the 
experimenter the opposite of what they themselves desire. 
Post-training test 2 of Experiment 2 was a “matched” trial, 
meaning that the experimenter showed the infant that she 
 
liked the same food as the infant. Because the majority of 
infants gave the experimenter the food that the experimenter 
(and the infant) liked, we can be confident that infants in 
Experiment 1 learned that preferences are diverse. Taken 
together, our results suggest that infants learned through 
training about the diversity of desires, moving from a less to 
a more sophisticated understanding of other’s preferences. 
On a broader level, these findings suggest that young 
children can learn from experience to make an important 
advance in explicit reasoning about Theory of Mind. 
One concern regarding these data is the relatively low 
statistical power that results from our experimental design 
and the small sample size for each experiment. Although the 
results in the Experiment 1 DDT condition were significant, 
it will be prudent to replicate these findings. This replication 
experiment is currently underway in the lab. 
An interesting finding in these experiments is that the 
participants performed identically during the pre-test and 
post-training test 1, but performed significantly above 
chance on post-training test 2 in Experiment 1. Both tests 
occurred after training and we had not predicted this pattern 
of results, so we now return to the question of why we only 
saw improvement on post-training test 2. 
One possible explanation for this improved performance 
on post-training test 2 is that post-training test 1 might act as 
another piece of evidence to train the infants to better 
understand diverse preferences. That is, post-training test 1 
gives infants yet another trial in which the experimenter 
demonstrates that she likes the opposite food to the infant. It 
is possible that this extra trial is what allows the infants to 
learn that preferences are subjective. This possibility can be 
examined by manipulating the number of training trials, to 
include an additional trial before post-training test 1 on Day 
1. Related to this, we can also examine what type of 
evidence is most informative – evidence that involves first-
person experience such as training trial 2 and post-training 
test 1, or training trials that involve observing two actors 
display diverse preferences. By manipulating the number 
and type of training trials across various conditions in future 
experiments, we can answer these questions. 
Another possible explanation for the improved 
performance only on Day 2 is the role of memory 
consolidation in sleep. Post-training test 2 occurs the 
following day, whereas post-training test 1 occurs on the 
same day as the training trials. Therefore, a potentially 
critical difference between the two tests is sleep. Research 
has shown that sleep is important for the consolidation of 
memories, and improvements in children’s and infants’ 
learning is correlated with longer and more intense sleep 
(Wilhelm, Prehn-Kristensen & Born, 2012). For example, 
Hupbach, Gomez, Bootzin, and Nadel (2009) found that 
when 15-month-old infants napped after they were exposed 
to an artificial language, they were more likely to remember 
the general grammatical pattern of that language 24 hours 
later, compared to infants who did not nap. It is possible that 
the infants in our experiment performed better on post-
training test 2 because they had slept. To address the sleep 
hypothesis, one could conduct an experiment similar to 
those here, except with the entire procedure occurring on the 
same day. After infants complete post-training test 1, half of 
the infants would take a nap and half would experience a 
similar delay without taking a nap. Following this, all 
infants would complete post-training test 2. If the infants 
who napped perform better than those who do not, then this 
would suggest that sleep consolidation is a crucial aspect of 
their improved performance. 
Conclusion 
Research on children's desire-based reasoning has 
persisted for decades. Here we examined a prediction from a 
particular model of how children attribute preferences to 
others, namely that appropriate training regarding the 
diversity of desires could result in infants undergoing a 
significant shift in conceptual development (Lucas et al., 
2014). We found that following exposure to different people 
demonstrating divergent desires, infants were able to move 
from a model of universal preferences to a model that 
allows for the individualization of preferences. The success 
of this training procedure more broadly suggests that early 
advances in Theory of Mind could be due to experience. 
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